free will, decision making, and happiness

My philosopher friend over at metaphysical.musings has been doing some thinking on free will and decision-making, which got me thinking about the idea of things we (truly) want. Definitely one of the messiest things about free will is that idea of happiness - happiness in that truest 'life satisfaction' sense we often point to but never really get at. On the foundation that 1) happiness is the aim of free will, and 2) free will is a function of desire, the key question here is kind of in the direction of "what is happiness?' but really it's 'what is it that we truly want (desire)?'. A lot of smart people have certainly done a lot more thinking on it than me, but we're so far from getting at a true comprehension of it that it devastatingly belittles the amount of time humanity has been trying.

One example that describes this is the question from college professor to student: "what do you want from this class?". Naturally the response is "I want an A," to which the professor appeals to the virtue of knowledge for it's own sake, as opposed to the more socially-driven "knowledge for the sake of accomplishing goals in life." One is right to conclude that the answer is driven by a set of social desires, but is it right to conclude that this kind of 'want' is less meaningful, correct, true, than other 'wants'? Well, as the example describes, traditional thinkers like Aristotle say yes: ultimately, happiness is in the direction of holding knowledge for the sake of holding it.

Clearly this is in contrast to the idea of seeking knowledge for the sake of seeking it (read: curiosity), and definitely in contrast to social happiness (BTW when I think of social wants, I'm thinking of many other kinds of social drives besides just 'being able to present yourself in a certain way to others'). Which in some sense, Aristotle and other traditional thinkers point to as meaningful and true, but I think that's my problem with these kinds of frameworks for happiness: there's so many conflicting kinds of desires - epistemological, social, moral, and others - and Aristotle's answer is something vague like 'balance in all things (oh and also BTW this true happiness is only attainable in the right circumstances, of which only 5% of the population has had the fortune of being brought into).' I mean, I very much appreciate the idea of 'what we want is a virtuous, balanced life because this leads to true happiness' but ultimately is what we want 1) what we're driven to do, or 2) what we must strive to do? Underlying questions: is what we want specifically to strive for things? Or do we not want to strive for things?

The problem is that it's a healthy dose of both but we (both humanity and individuals) have no way of grasping what 'both' looks like or even how to reconcile both existing at the same time. I go through a lot of this thinking in the commentary by referencing the examples described in original post, but suffice to say: I don't think we know what we want, but I definitely think happiness and the ideal self has a lot more to do with structures outside our internal sense of virtue, reason, and 'independence.' I think that's why you end up with questions like "if the ideal self is a function of free will, why do we have social systems of rewards and punishments? Why give children rules and boundaries and advantages if the goal is to help the child grow?"

My short answer: it's all (mostly) social.

Aristotle isn't the only one who's put some thought into it and there are a lot more modern ideas on happiness; the 72-yr longitudinal study that came into the public eye earlier this year curated by George Vaillant comes to mind (despite it's limitations: all male subjects, all Harvard educated). Other more traditionally philosophical thoughts too, since in retrospect I've essentially discussed happiness here as deeply as an entry-level freshman. I'm just at a loss to think of any immediately, maybe you have some in mind?

networks, identity, and relationship dynamics

As we figure out how to manage relationships online and multiple networks, it's interesting to see how aware we're becoming of easily taken-for-granted dynamics. Things as simple as how we think of and project ourselves across different groups and circles, as demonstrated nicely in the piece above. I occasionally find myself thinking about twitter acquaintances and how we struggle to manage them - if you're like me we are forced to reassess what role we are playing in these peoples lives over time, as we grow internally and develop newer ideas. Are these people relevant to my life anymore? Is that an appropriate question to even ask (these are people, after all, and we connected on some level)? This is nothing specific to Twitter, but the sheer scale of the relationships we can build online makes it much more salient.

And as new networks emerge, we not only have new tools for sharing things that interest us or others, but we also have new ways of defining ourselves by the networks we choose to participate in. Most social platforms assert that anyone can join, but just like anything else only a related community ends up doing so. It's important to remember that as ubiquitous as any platform may seem, there's also a whole world of people out there who have either opted-out, don't relate, or for any number of reasons don't feel compelled to participate.

How do your networks, niche or otherwise, speak to the way you manage online (and offline) relationships?